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Abstract 
 
In this article, the authors discuss the approach that the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) adopts 
in deciding which of the European treaty freedoms apply to third country situations. On 13 November 2012 the 
CJEU delivered a landmark ruling on this matter in the Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation case. The CJEU 
observed that if the tax legislation in question is of a general nature then the free movement of capital also 
applies where EU resident entities derive taxable proceeds from majority interests held in companies resident 
in third countries. In reaching this conclusion, the CJEU adopted an approach that seems to differentiate from 
that applied in earlier judgments. Moreover, the CJEU’s findings clearly differ from the approach taken by the 
Dutch Supreme Court in various recent judgments. The Dutch Supreme Court considers external cross-border 
investments in majority shareholding interests as acts of establishment, which are not protected under EU law, 
because the freedom of establishment does not apply to third country situations. Assessing EU jurisprudence, 
the authors seek to answer the question which treaty freedom applies in cases involving the direct taxation of 
proceeds from cross-border third-country corporate shareholding interests; and where does the approach 
adopted by the CJEU differ from that of the Dutch Supreme Court? The authors further address some potential 
consequences that the CJEU case law on this matter could have on the future interpretation of the freedom of 
capital. 
 
1 Introduction 
 
On November 13, 2012, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) rendered its second judgment in the 
Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation case (‘FII 2’).3 In this judgment, the CJEU again ruled on the reference 
for a preliminary ruling on whether the former UK double taxation relief rules for inward bound dividends were 
contrary to EU law. The judgment is interesting in several respects. For example, the CJEU addresses whether 
the UK methods used for indirect credit and exemption are compatible with the treaty freedoms. However, this 
aspect is not touched upon in this article. 
In this article, we discuss the approach adopted by the CJEU in deciding which of the European treaty 
freedoms apply to third country situations. Much has been written about this issue in the professional tax 
literature.4 After the CJEU had rendered its first judgment in this case, it became apparent that several of the 
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 It is an adaptation of two articles published in the Weekblad voor Fiscaal Recht. Cf. E. Nijkeuter and M.F. de Wilde, “Met de kennis van 
nu...” (“With the knowledge we now have...”) (part I), WFR 2013/138, and E. Nijkeuter and M.F. de Wilde, “Met de kennis van nu...” (“With 
the knowledge we now have...”) (part II); On FII 2, case law and what may follow, WFR 2013/185. 
3 CJEU case C-35/11 (Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation – FII 2), V-N 2013/3.8. Cf. S.C.W. Douma, ‘Vrij Kapitaalverkeer na FII(2)’ (“The 
free movement of capital in the wake of FII(2)), NTFR 2012/2689. 
4 Some of the professional literature available on this subject: D.S. Smit, Freedom of Investment between EU and Non-EU Member States 
and its Impact on Corporate Income Tax Systems within the European Union, Tilburg: Tilburg University, 2011, Joachim Englisch, ‘Taxation 
of Cross-Border Dividends and EC Fundamental Freedoms’, 38 Intertax (2010, no. 4) 197, at 197-221, Axel Cordewener, ‘Free movement of 
capital between EU Member States and Third Countries: How Far Has the Door Been Closed?’, 18 EC Tax Review (2009, no. 6) 260, at 260-
263, Maarten de Wilde and Renata Fontana, ‘ECJ holds German legislation disallowing write down on participations acquired from non-
residents compatible with free movement of capital (Glaxo Wellcome)’, European Tax Service, BNA International Inc., October 2009, at 24-
25, Sigrid Hemels, Joost Rompen, Patrick Smet, Isabelle De Waele, Steffan Adfeldt, Gottfried Breuninger, Markus Ernst, Viviane Carpentier, 
Siamak Mostafavi, ‘Freedom of Establishment or Free movement of capital: Is There an Order of Priority? Conflicting Visions of National 
Courts and the ECJ’, 19 EC Tax Review 19 (2010, no. 1), at 19-31, Ben J. Kiekebeld and Daniel S. Smit, ‘Freedom of establishment and free 
movement of capital in Association and Partnership Agreements and direct taxation’, 16 EC Tax Review 216 (2007, no. 5), at 216-230, 
Daniël S. Smit and Ben J. Kiekebeld, EC Free Movement of Capital, Income Taxation and Third Countries: Four Selected Issues, Kluwer Law 
International, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2008 (Smit/Kiekebeld 2008), Daniël S. Smit, ‘The relationship between the free movement of capital and 
the other EC Treaty freedoms in third country relationships in the field of direct taxation: a question of exclusivity, parallelism or 
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litigating parties held majority interests in companies resident in ‘third countries’. 5 As the UK court considered 
CJEU case law on the applicable treaty freedoms in such cases unclear, it requested a preliminary ruling on this 
issue. Does the case at hand involve a restriction of the freedom of establishment, a restriction of the free 
movement of capital, or a restriction of both (at the same time)? In reaching its conclusion, the CJEU adopted 
an approach that seems to differentiate from that applied in earlier judgments.6 Broadly speaking, the CJEU 
concluded that if the tax legislation in question is of a general nature then the free movement of capital also 
applies where EU resident entities derive taxable proceeds from majority interests held in companies resident 
in third countries. This approach clearly differs from the approach adopted by the Dutch Supreme Court in 
various recent judgments, which was also based on earlier CJEU case law. The Dutch Supreme Court considers 
external cross-border investments in majority shareholding interests as acts of establishment, which are not 
protected under EU law, because the freedom of establishment does not apply to third country situations. 
In this article, we analyze the judgment rendered in the FII 2 case. Which treaty freedom applies in 
cases involving the taxation of proceeds from cross-border third-country corporate shareholding interests and 
where does the approach adopted by the CJEU in the FII 2 case differ from that of the Dutch Supreme Court? 
We also address some potential consequences the FII 2 judgment could have on the future interpretation of 
the free movement of capital. 
 
2 The path taken by the CJEU when deciding which treaty freedom applies 
 
2.1 Qualification of type of movement relevant from a legal perspective, but the CJEU’s approach has not 
always been clear 
 
The question as to which freedom applies is particularly relevant for economic activities outside the territory of 
the European Union/European Economic Area (EU/EEA).7 After all, the persons and territory covered by 
primary European Union law differs per type of movement involved. The free movement of people, goods and 
services only applies to citizens (or employees) of the Members States.8 Moreover, these freedoms only apply 
to acts of establishment, movement of goods or services within the territory of the EU/EEA. This is different 
under the free movement of capital, which extends to third countries. The persons and territory falling under 
the free movement of capital is also universal.9 Consequently, Member States are allowed to discourage 
                                                                                                                                                        
causality?’, 16 EC Tax Review 252 (2007, no. 6), at 252-267, Axel Cordewener, Georg W. Kofler and Clemens Philipp Schindler, ‘Free 
Movement of Capital And Third Countries: Exploring The Outer Boundaries with Lasertec, A and B and Holböck’, 47 European Taxation 371 
(2007, no. 8-9), at 371-376, Axel Cordewener, Georg W. Kofler and Clemens Philipp Schindler, ‘Free movement of capital, third country 
relationships and national tax law: an emerging issue before the ECJ’, 47 European Taxation 107 (2007, no. 3), at 107-119, B.J. Kiekebeld, 
‘Kapitaalverkeer versus vestigingsverkeer: eindelijk echt duidelijk?’, (Free movement of capital versus freedom of establishment: clarity at 
last?) NTFR-B 2013/11, D.S. Smit, ‘Europese verdragsvrijheden and derde landen: invloed op de Nederlandse vennootschaps- en 
dividendbelasting’ (European treaty freedoms and third countries: their impact on Dutch corporate income tax and dividend withholding 
tax), TFO 2012/122, S.J.C. Hemels and J.W. Rompen, ‘Vestiging of kapitaalverkeer: welke vrijheid heeft prioriteit? (Freedom of 
establishment or free movement of capital: which freedom takes precedence?), WFR 2010/1058, M.G.H. van der Kroon, Het Baarscriterium 
krijgt invulling’ (The Baars criterion explained), WFR 2010/229, B.J. Kiekebeld, ‘Kapitaalverkeer versus vestigingsverkeer’(Free movement of 
capital versus freedom of establishment), NTFR-B 2009/47, A.A. Fase, ‘Het rangordevraagstuk in derdelandenverhoudingen’ (The ranking 
issue in third country relationship), WFR 2008/687, W.F.E.M.Egelie, ‘Deelnemingen en de samenloop tussen art. 43 EG and art. 56 EG: hoe 
zit het nu?’ (Participations and the conflict between Article 43 EC and Article 56 EC: please explain?), NTFR 2007/1374, WFR 2008/687, 
P.J.J.M. Peeters, ‘Meerderheidsdeelnemingen: bestaat er een rangorde tussen art. 43 and 56 EG?’ (Majority interest participations: how do 
Article 43 and 56 EU rank?) WFR 2007/777, as well as E. Nijkeuter, ‘Samenloop van art. 43 EG en art. 56 EG’ (Conflict between Article 43 EC 
and Article 56 EC), WFR 2006/249. 
5 CJEU case C-446/04 (Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation – FII 1). 
6 CJEU case C-439/07 and C-499/07 (KBC Bank) and CJEU case C-311/08 (SGI). 
7 Broadly speaking, the EU/EEA territory is the territory of the EU/EEA Member States on the European continent. A problem arises, for 
example, in defining the overseas areas of the EU Member States. This matter e.g. also arises within the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Are 
the Caribbean island administrations of the Netherlands and the other territories making up the Kingdom of the Netherlands third 
countries? The Dutch Supreme Court has requested a preliminary ruling on this issue (see BNB 2012/197-298). 
8 Art. 54 TFEU. 
9 Art. 63-66 TFEU. Please note that Article 63 TFEU deals with capital movements in an objective manner, aimed at the ‘object’ of the 
freedom. Article 49 TFEU (freedom of establishment) focuses on the person, i.e. the ‘national’, and is aimed at the ‘subject’ of the freedom. 
Cf. Smit/Kiekebeld 2008, loc. cit., paragraph 3.3. 
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economic activities beyond the external borders of the EU/EEA,10 unless the legal transactions/movements 
qualify as capital movements. The EU/EEA Member States are not allowed to restrict or discriminate these 
capital movements, save for the application of the standstill provision.11 
 Despite the importance of precisely defining what qualifies as a movement of capital on the one hand, 
and what qualifies as an act of establishment, supply of goods or provision of services on the other hand, the 
approach adopted by the CJEU has not always been clear. This applies in particular to the distinction between 
capital movements and acts of establishment, and then primarily to the extent that it involves investments in a 
shareholding that allow the holder to exercise a decisive influence in the running of the company in which the 
interest is held.12 In situations where the interest of the holder does not confer a decisive influence, the CJEU’s 
approach seems to be consistent. In those cases, the investment and the accompanying investment proceeds 
are capital movements.13 
 
2.2  Factual approach or object and purpose? 
 
Until its judgment in the FII 2 case, the case law of the CJEU did not always seem consistent in how it dealt with 
majority interests in third country situations. In some cases the CJEU qualified the movement based on the 
facts and circumstances, i.e. a factual approach. In other cases the CJEU based its conclusion on the ratio of the 
assessed measure, i.e. an object and purpose approach.14 
The CJEU opted for the factual approach in various judgments,15 where its conclusion on whether a 
capital movement or act of establishment was involved was based on the facts and circumstances. If the 
shareholder has a ‘decisive influence’ on the underlying business activities, then this is regarded as an act of 
establishment. This is also referred to as the ‘Baars criterion’.16 This approach leads to the conclusion in favor 
of the freedom of establishment. The Dutch Supreme Court has adopted this line of reasoning consistently in 
its judgments on these matters.17 If the facts concern an act of establishment outside the external borders of 
the EU/EEA, then primary European Union law does not apply under this approach. In such cases, EU law is 
unavailable to resolve a substantially restrictive measure. 
In various other judgments, the CJEU based its conclusion on whether a movement of capital or act of 
establishment was involved, on the subject matter of the tax measure at hand − and therein the uncertainty 
evolved.18 In those cases, the CJEU looked at the aim and the spirit of the potentially restricting measure in 
order to qualify the capital movement. If the tax measure only applies to interests that allow the shareholder 
                                                 
10 This is in comparison to their intra-EU/EEA equivalents. 
11 Art. 64 TFEU. External cross-border capital movements fall under the free movement of capital, with the exception of restrictive and 
discriminatory measures in respect of ‘direct investments’ in place in the laws of the Member States as at December 31, 1993. Before this 
date, there was no provision in Community law that directly applied to capital movements involving third countries. Cf., e.g., Dutch 
Supreme Court case no. BNB 2005/224, in which the Dutch Supreme Court concluded that, in view of the Bosal case (CJEU case C-168/01), 
the deduction limitation for participation costs that is untenable under EU law, does not apply to costs incurred before January 1, 1994, 
relating to participations in entities resident outside the European Economic Community as it existed at that time. The Bosal judgment did 
affect the pre-1994 participations costs that involved entities resident within the Community, see e.g., Dutch Supreme Court case no. BNB 
2005/224. 
12 In cases involving the distinction between a capital movement or the provision of a service, the CJEU seems to apply a causal test or 
‘weighing of interests approach’: if the measure affects more than one freedom, then the freedom which is ‘affected primarily’ applies, the 
other freedoms are then not taken into consideration if they are ‘entirely secondary’. C.f. CJEU cases C-204/90 (Bachmann), C-36/02 
(Omega Spielhallen) and C-452/04 (Fidium Finanz). It is worth noting that Article 57 TFEU includes a preferential rule for the provision of 
services that stipulates that the other freedoms take precedence over the movement of services. The CJEU seems to be ignoring this 
provision. 
13 Cf. the FII 1 case and the CJEU joined cases C-436/08, C-437/08 (Haribo/Salinen). CJEU case no. C-208/00 (Überseering). 
14 Cf. for example Hemels et al, loc.cit.loc. cit, at 31, Englisch, loc. cit., at 197-221, and De Wilde/Fontana, loc.cit.loc. cit, at 24-25.  
15 Cf. Baars, loc.cit., Burda, loc.cit. In Burda, the CJEU concluded that only the freedom of establishment applies to majority interests, as this 
effectively involves decisive control. 
16 Cf. the ‘Baars criterium’, Van der Kroon, loc.cit. 
17 Cf. Dutch Supreme Court BNB 2006/254, BNB 2009/23-24, BNB 2009/216, BNB 2009/239, BNB 2009/261, BNB 2010/291-292, BNB 
2011/162, BNB 2012/102, BNB 2012/197-198 and Dutch Supreme Court, October 5, 2012, no. 11/02956.  
18 Cf. CJEU cases C-182/08 (Glaxo), C-157/05 (Holböck) and Haribo/Salinen, loc.cit. In the Holböck and Glaxo cases, the CJEU assessed the 
majority interests under the free movement of capital, on the basis of the ratio of the disputed rule. Cf. FII 2, loc.cit., Observation 90. 
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to exercise a decisive influence on the underlying activities, then it is considered an act of establishment.19 If 
the measure is aimed at taxing portfolio investment returns, or if it aims to combat abusive tax practices – the 
measure for instance seeks to counter the tax-induced sheltering of mobile intangible resources in controlled 
entities in low-taxing jurisdictions, then this is considered a capital movement.20 The CJEU also adopted this 
approach in cases where the facts involve an investment in a majority interest.21 It seems that this line of 
reasoning has also been followed by the French, German and UK tax courts.22 
Complicating matters is the fact that the CJEU does not explain why it has adopted these apparent 
different approaches. The focus is on majority interests under general tax rules and thus on situations whereby 
the shareholder exercises a decisive influence, while it cannot be ascertained from the subject matter of the 
disputed tax rules whether these are targeted at direct investments, portfolio investments or the combating of 
tax abuse. In such cases, it is unclear how the movement should to be qualified from an EU law perspective, 
with the result being legal uncertainty about the scope of EU law in third country situations. It seems that the 
CJEU tried to clarify this issue in FII 2 by merging its approaches into one single consistent approach.23  
 
2.3 CJEU in FII 2: from an object and purpose, and factual perspective 
 
In FII 2, the CJEU based its choice of applicable freedom on the object and purpose approach, only applying the 
factual approach where it apparently considered this necessary. Firstly, the CJEU ruled that under EU law tax 
measures whose subject matter is restricted to majority participations must be assessed as acts of 
establishment. This is exclusively governed by the freedom of establishment.24 This could involve regimes 
dealing with groups of affiliated corporate entities, such as tax grouping regimes (e.g., group relief, tax 
consolidation) or thin capitalization rules. Secondly, the CJEU concluded that tax measures relating to portfolio 
investment interests, or measures relating to combating abuse must be assessed as capital movements or the 
combating thereof. Such situations are exclusively governed by the free movement of capital.25 An example is 
the application of anti-abuse measures in respect of portfolio investments made through 
subsidiaries/companies in low-taxing jurisdictions, such as controlled foreign company regimes.26 Another 
example is the application of regimes that seek to counter dividend stripping operations. Third, and finally – 
and this is important – the CJEU concluded that tax measures of general application must be assessed in light of 
the free movement of capital in third country situations.27 This applies to both minority and majority interests, 
and irrespective of the active or passive nature of the investment. We consider this to be a remarkable 
conclusion. Let’s look at how the CJEU arrived at it. 
                                                 
19 Cf. FII 1, loc.cit. CJEU case C-208/00 (Űberseering), Baars, loc.cit. and Burda, loc.cit. Cf. CJEU case C-387/11 (Commission/Belgium), 
Observation 34 and FII 2, loc.cit., Observation 91. 
20 Cf. Haribo/Salinen, loc.cit., Glaxo, loc.cit., FII 2, loc.cit., Observation 92, and Cie/België, loc.cit., Observation 34. 
21 Cf. Glaxo, loc.cit., and CJEU case C-31/11 (Scheunemann). 
22 Cf. respectively Cour Administrative d’Appel de Nancy, August 22, 2008, no. 07NC00783, Bundesfinanzhof (‘BFH’), November 26, 2008, I 
R 7/08, Internationales Steuerrecht 7/2009, 244, BFH June 8, 2010, I B 199/09 and High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, Test Claimants 
in the FII Group Litigation v. IRC, November 27, 2008 (2009) STC 254 (Case No.: HC03C02223 and others, (2008) EWHC 2893 (Ch). Cf. 
Hemels et al., loc.cit., at 26-31. 
23 Cf. FII 2, loc.cit., Observation 88-104. In H&I 2013/3.1 Peter Wattel points out that the judgment was rendered by the Grand Chamber of 
the CJEU, consisting of a presiding judge, a deputy presiding judge and the presiding judges of the ‘chambers of five’. This leads Wattel to 
the conclusion that the CJEU must have been aware that FII 2 contradicts earlier case law. 
24 Cf. FII 2, loc.cit., Observation 91. 
25 Idem, Observation 92. 
26 However, it should be noted that if the free movement of capital applies, the standstill provision possibly does not, as it only applies to 
‘direct investments’. This seems to refer to the commercial definition of ‘direct investments’ i.e. as distinct from ‘portfolio investments’. 
The CJEU also seems to make this distinction, for example, in CJEU cases C-282/04 and C-283/04 (Cie/Nederland), Observation 19, 
Haribo/Salinen, loc.cit. and CJEU case C-194/06 (Orange Small Cap Fund). Cf. e.g., also Dutch Supreme Court BNB 2012/102, in which the 
Dutch Supreme Court ruled, roughly translated: ‘not for portfolio investment purposes? Therefore direct investment’. In line with this 
interpretation, the limitation of the standstill provision only applies to investments in shareholdings held as business assets. The standstill 
provision would then not apply to shareholdings held for investment purposes, leading to the traditional distinction – as typically 
recognized in income and capital gains taxation also – between portfolio investments and direct investment activities. 
27 Cf. FII 2, loc.cit., Observation 104. 
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The CJEU concluded that the free movement of capital applies to an external cross-border investment 
by a UK shareholder with a controlling interest.28 This conclusion was reached by ‘taking into account the facts 
of the case at hand’. The CJEU ruled that it is not possible to determine whether general tax measures, such as 
that of the disputed UK rules, as such mainly relate to acts of establishment or capital movements. The object 
and purpose approach, i.e. looking at the subject matter of the rules, is therefore not helpful. That is why the 
CJEU took the facts and circumstances into consideration in order to conclude how the movement should be 
qualified and to determine which freedom applied. The CJEU ruled that the UK rules fall under the treaty 
provisions concerning the freedom of establishment. However, the CJEU noted that the freedom of 
establishment does not apply, as the case in question concerned a controlling interest in a third country 
situation; the freedom of establishment does not apply to third country situations. The CJEU subsequently 
concluded that the rules must be assessed in light of the free movement of capital, irrespective of the size of 
the shareholding.29 
Does this mean that the free movement of capital applies, because the freedom of establishment does 
not? We do not consider that this can be a contrario deduced from the CJEU’s conclusions. Rather, it appears 
that the CJEU recognizes alternatives paths, whereby if it finds that one path (establishment) reaches a dead 
end, it will take the other path (capital). 
It is worth noting that the CJEU explicitly rejects the opinions of the UK, German, French and Dutch 
governments. They argue that in the case of general tax measures, not only the intention of the tax legislation, 
but also the facts of the case at hand must be taken into account. We assume that they accordingly mean that 
the free movement of capital should not be applied in those cases involving on the facts an act of 
establishment.30 When seen from that perspective, we consider it relevant to establish, for example, whether 
the shareholding interest at hand in reality involves a passively held shareholding investment (capital 
movement/portfolio investment), an actively held participation in a company which grant the shareholder no 
decisive influence (capital movement/direct investment) or an active direct investment in an underlying 
business activity through a controlling shareholding interest in a company (act of establishment/direct 
investment). However, the CJEU nevertheless rejects this view, as it leads to outcomes that it considers 
incompatible with the free movement of capital. In this respect, the CJEU points out that the treaty states that 
the free movement of capital also governs “capital movements involving establishment or direct investment”.31 
The CJEU refers more specifically to investments that offer the shareholder the opportunity to actively 
participate in the activities of the company in which it holds an interest.  
However, the CJEU did acknowledge the existence of a limitation;32 one that we have not seen before 
in CJEU case law, and which we find intriguing yet somewhat difficult to understand. The limitation has two 
components: one aimed at ‘economic operators’, the other at ‘conditions for market access’. 
The CJEU notes the following in respect of the economic operators. According to the CJEU, the fact 
that the freedom of establishment does not apply to third country situations, means that it is important to 
ensure that the free movement of capital is not used by “(...) economic operators who do not fall within the 
limits of the territorial scope of [the] freedom of establishment (...)” for the sole purpose of being able to apply 
the freedoms. The CJEU seems to be formulating a type of anti-abuse approach in order to prevent EU law 
being applied to acts of establishment through the back door. Who are these economic operators? We think 
                                                 
28 Idem Observations 94-99. 
29 Idem Observation 99. 
30Idem, Observation 101.  
31 FII 2, loc.cit., Observations 101-102, in which the CJEU refers to Article 64 (1) TFEU. The standstill provision of Article 64 refers to 
‘establishment’. This implies that the act of establishment is also included under the free movement of capital. After all, had that not been 
the case, the act of establishment would not have had to be included in the ‘standstill’ in order to use the free movement of capital to 
justify the restrictive measures in place since the end of 1993 for external cross-border acts of establishment, as the freedom of 
establishment does not apply to third country situations. Cf. Smit/Kiekebeld 2008, loc.cit., at 18. 
32 Cf. FII 2, loc.cit., Observation100. 
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they are legal entities with a ‘European nationality’33 that are, for tax purposes, resident outside the territories 
of the EU/EEA,34 or that are resident in the EU/EEA, but whose indirect or direct35 acts of establishment occur 
outside the EU/EEA36. These entities fall under the personal scope of the freedom of establishment because of 
their ‘European passport’, but do not fall under the territorial scope of this freedom, as they are in fact 
investing outside the EU/EEA territory37-38; it involves outbound investments in other words. This is also in line 
with the CJEU reference to legislation of a Member State that applies to ’a company of that Member State in a 
third country’. That is why we did not initially think of inbound investments. The CJEU’s observations initially do 
not appear to refer to foreign law entities performing indirect or direct39 acts of establishment within the 
territory of the EU/EEA, as they fall outside the personal scope of the freedom of establishment due to their 
‘non-European’ passport, albeit inside the territorial scope of this freedom (because they are in fact investing 
within the territory of the EU/EEA). However, on the other hand this is not in line with the CJEU’s reference to 
the legislation of a Member State that applies to ‘a company from a third country in that Member State’.  
We do not understand this. Isn’t it precisely this situation that falls inside the territorial scope of the 
freedom of establishment, but outside its personal scope? The only way we can reconcile these findings of the 
CJEU is to accept that the territorial scope of the freedom of establishment is governed by both the location of 
the investment and the location of the investor. Loosely formulated: the geographical location of its income-
generating activities (situs/territoriality) or its residence for tax purposes (domicile). Only then, for example, 
will the American parent company with a primary act of establishment (transfer place of 
management/permanent establishment) or a secondary act of establishment (subsidiary) on the territory of a 
Member State of the European Union, fall outside the territorial scope of the freedom of establishment. But 
then, we do not understand the reasoning behind the FII 2 judgment in the first place. Haven’t we just 
identified both categories of external cross-border acts of establishment (inbound and outbound) and 
subsequently placed them under the limitation? If the CJEU apparently does not want to recognize external 
cross-border acts of establishment as falling under the free movement of capital, why does it then first qualify 
them as capital movements only then to cryptically exclude them by way of a newly developed limitation? Had 
the CJEU wanted to arrive at the conclusion of excluding the availability of invoking the freedom of capital 
regarding third-country majority shareholding investments, it could have also qualified the movement as an act 
of establishment to which the freedom of establishment applies exclusively. Then, the freedom of capital 
wouldn’t have been available either. That is, since the third country movement in that interpretation would 
have been qualified as an act of establishment rather than a capital movement. That is, the approach as taken 
by the Dutch Supreme Court (see par. 3 hereunder). In short, we are left in the dark on this matter.40 
                                                 
33 We are referring to legal entities controlled by the company laws of one of the EU/EEA Member States, whereby the residence of these 
entities for tax purposes is located outside the territory of the EU/EEA. For example, if the Member States in question apply the 
incorporation doctrine in their civil law. 
34 See the ‘Programme général pour la suppression des restrictions à la liberté d'établissement’ (General Program for the abolition of 
restrictions on the freedom of establishment), 18 décembre 1961, Journal Officiel des Communautés Européennes 2, 15 janvier 1962, Titre 
1. . See also D.M. Weber, Belastingontwijking en de EG-verdragsvrijheden (Tax avoidance and EU treaty freedoms), FM no. 105, Kluwer, 
Deventer 2003, at 55. 
35 We are referring to business activities that are performed directly, i.e. through a permanent establishment in a third country, or are 
performed indirectly, i.e. through a controlled subsidiary resident in a third country. 
36 Cf. also CJEU case C-415/06 (Stahlwerk), FED 2008/56. This case involved a German GmbH that performed a business activity outside the 
territory of the EU through a participation held in a tax transparent German partnership through a permanent establishment. The GmbH 
wanted to credit a foreign loss against the domestic profits, thereby invoking the freedom of establishment. However, this was not 
permitted under German tax law. The CJEU ruled that the freedom of establishment did not apply in this case, as the loss-making business 
activities took place outside the territory of the EU.  
37 We consider that the territorial scope is, or should be, determined by the location of the investment: situs, territoriality. We also 
consider that, from an analytical perspective, the place of effective management also expresses the territoriality principle: situs.  
38 We also take into consideration entities under foreign law performing acts of establishment outside the territory of the EU/EEA. They are 
excluded from both the personal and territorial scope of the freedom of establishment (Article 54 TFEU in conjunction with Article 49 
TFEU). This category may be less interesting now that their activities are performed outside the EU/EEA. 
39 We refer to business activities that are performed directly, i.e. through a permanent establishment in an EU/EEA Member State, or 
indirectly, i.e. through a controlled subsidiary resident in an EU/EEA Member State. 
40 Peter Wattel, loc.cit., regards this argument of the CJEU as a WTO argument. As seen from that perspective, this newly formulated 
limitation would mean that the unilateral extension of the free movement of capital toward third countries would not undermine the EU’s 
negotiating position within the WTO.  
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As regards the second component, i.e. the conditions for market access, it almost looks as if the CJEU 
is anxious to point out that the newly formulated restriction does not apply in full. The CJEU ruled that the 
danger it identified – backdoor access to the freedoms – is not relevant to the case at hand. This is because the 
British economic double tax relief regime ‘does not relate to the conditions for access to the market’, but ‘only 
involves a tax measure’, i.e. the corporate tax treatment of inbound dividends. As we understand it, the CJEU 
basically observes that the case is not, for instance, about the issue of a license in order to carry on a business 
or suchlike within an EU Member State’s jurisdiction – as was the case in Fidium Finanz –,41 it is just about UK 
taxation. And, as a result of this, the limitation apparently does not apply here. 
It seems that the CJEU makes an analytical distinction here between measures aimed at market access 
– the port of entry – and measures aimed at taxing returns generated by economic activities that take place 
after the port of entry has been passed. If this ‘escape’ must be so interpreted – and for the time being we 
assume this to be the case – then it does not seem to apply to direct taxation. However, regardless, we 
consider this distinction somewhat tenuous. The distinction between a foreigner only being able to access a 
market subject to the granting of a license or permit and a foreigner being allowed to operate on the internal 
market but being more heavily taxed relative to domestic investors, in our view, analytically is a mere gradual 
one in the end. 
In summary, the FII 2 case has made clear that general tax measures in third country situations fall 
under the free movement of capital and can be substantively assessed in terms of their compatibility or 
incompatibility with this freedom, irrespective of the size of the shareholding interest, or the reason for 
investment. 
  
3 Approach adopted by Dutch Supreme Court consistent, but not in line with CJEU 
 
3.1 The Dutch Supreme Court applies a factual approach 
 
In the recent past, the Dutch Supreme Court has had to deal with the qualification of external cross-border 
investments in majority shareholding interests under EU law on various occasions.42 These judgments were 
rendered without first asking the CJEU for a preliminary ruling. That is, until recently.43 The Supreme Court 
probably considered the CJEU’s interpretation of EU law clear on this issue, i.e. an acte éclairé.44 
In opting for the qualification given to cross-border movements under EU law and the accompanying 
applicable freedom, the Dutch Supreme Court consistently adopts the factual approach.45 The Supreme Court 
bases its conclusion on whether a capital movement or an act of establishment is present, solely on the facts 
and circumstances of the case at hand. As a result, taxpayers that are restricted in earning benefits from 
majority shareholding interests in third countries are not protected by EU law, according to the Dutch Supreme 
Court. In its opinion, these scenarios fall outside from the scope of the treaty freedoms. In the case of majority 
interests, the taxpayer shareholder exercises a decisive influence on the activities performed by the company 
in which it holds an interest. The Dutch Supreme Court therefore considers such a scenario to in fact constitute 
an act of establishment, which supplants the capital movement and therefore the application of the free 
movement of capital. As the freedom of establishment does not apply to external cross-border acts of 
                                                 
41 Fidium Finanz AG, loc.cit. For example, restrictions imposed on foreign investors. CJEU C-244/11 (Commission/Greece) for example 
concerned a scheme under which prior authorization is required for the acquisition of voting rights representing 20% or more of the share 
capital in certain companies (former state-owned companies). The CJEU ruled that an interest such as the one in the case at hand only 
qualifies as an act of establishment due to the ‘definite’ influence conferred by that interest on the company’s affairs. It is noteworthy that 
the term ‘economic operators’ is used several times in the judgment when referring to the investors. 
42 See the references in footnote 17. 
43 Chronologically after Advocate-General Jääskinen’s opinion, July 19, 2012, FII 2, loc.cit., the Dutch Supreme Court asked the CJEU 
whether the free movement of capital applies to a majority interest held by an Antillean shareholder in a Dutch company. Cf. Dutch 
Supreme Court BNB 2012/197-198. 
44 Hemels et al, loc.cit., at 29, consider this remarkable in view of the diverse approaches adopted by the various national tax courts of the 
EU Member States. 
45 Cf. Baars, loc.cit., Burda, loc.cit. 
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establishment, the available Dutch Supreme Court’s case law up until today considers the treaty freedoms not 
applicable with regards to the taxation in the Netherlands of proceeds from third country majority 
shareholding interests. The Supreme Court is yet to substantively address the operation of the treaty freedoms 
in such cases. 
 
3.2 What is the difference between the path followed by the Dutch Supreme Court and that followed by the 
CJEU? Exclusive versus alternative  
 
In hindsight, the approach adopted by the Dutch Supreme Court seems to have been wrong. In cases involving 
shareholders with a decisive influence, the CJEU has concluded that the free movement of capital can be 
substantively applied. Both judicial bodies argue that a facts and circumstances approach must be adopted, as 
an object and purpose approach fails when applied to general tax measures. 
What is the difference between the path followed by the Dutch Supreme Court and that followed by 
the CJEU? We believe that the difference lies in the exclusiveness of the path followed by the Dutch Supreme 
Court, whereas the CJEU seems to recognize two alternative paths. The Dutch Supreme Court considered, 
thereby referring to the decisive influence of the shareholder, that such a scenario – exclusively – involves an 
act of establishment. Therefore, the Supreme Court arrived at the conclusion that such a case is governed 
exclusively by the freedom of establishment. However, the CJEU considers that such a scenario also involves a 
capital movement to which the free movement of capital – alternatively – applies; therefore applying that 
freedom in third country majority shareholding situations as well, and, by reference to the treaty text, also if 
the case at hand in fact concerns an act of establishment. With regard to majority interests, general tax 
measures must also comply with the free movement of capital. The CJEU does express concern about abuse 
situations, although it does not seem to see any problems arising as regards taxation. 
 
4 Consequences for interpreting the free movement of capital in future: what purpose does the 
shareholding serve? 
 
Since FII 2, it therefore appears that the free movement of capital can be used to assess the EU compatibility of 
general tax measures in third country situations, irrespective of the size of the shareholding. What could this 
imply for future developments in EU law? 
We expect, in future, to see further progress on the application of the standstill provision and the 
justification grounds. The standstill provision applies to tax measures in place as at December 31, 1993, in 
respect of direct investments. As this provision does not apply to tax measures in respect of portfolio 
investments, we consider that it does not apply to majority interests in companies limited by shares held for 
portfolio investment purposes.46 Furthermore, in contrast to movements within the EU, it is easier to justify 
restrictions and discrimination in third country situations, for example, on the basis of ‘combating the (risk of) 
abuse’, or ‘the effectiveness of fiscal supervision’ in situations where no mutual assistance rules are available to 
effectively enable tax audits to take place.47 
With regard to majority interests in third country situations, time will tell to what extent one of the 
justification grounds (territoriality principle, combating abuse, and effectiveness of fiscal supervision) or the 
standstill provision can be used to approve unilaterally imposed disruptions to the internal market. As regards 
the standstill provision, we believe that the legal issue of whether the interest is held for portfolio investment 
purposes (no direct investment, no standstill), or for business purposes (direct investment, therefore standstill 
in respect of rules in place as at year-end 1993) will prove relevant. We suspect that this will increase the 
                                                 
46 Cf. footnote 26. 
47 CJEU cases C-540/07 (Commission/Italy) C-101/05 (Skatteverket v. A), C-451/05 (ELISA), C-72/09 (Rimbaud) and Haribo/Salinen, loc.cit. 
However, this justification ground must be proportionate and suit the purposes of the regulation. Cf. Erwin Nijkeuter, ‘Exchange of 
Information and the Free Movement of Capital between Member States and Third Countries’,20 EC Tax Review 232 (2011, no. 5), at 232-
241. 
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pressure to qualify the capital movement as a direct investment, also in situations concerning majority 
interests. 
As a final comment we would like to note that, for the purposes of qualifying the movement under the 
standstill provision as a ‘direct investment’ pursuant to EU law, we consider the presence of a ‘decisive 
influence’ as a necessary, but insufficient, condition. Control is only a means to an end, for example the 
carrying on of a business. After all, the control is merely a tool to manage the underlying business activities. 
Although a 100% interest is a strong indication that a direct investment is present, that does not necessarily 
have to be the case. It is also possible to portfolio invest by way of a 100% shareholding. Controlled foreign 
company regimes actually try to counter the opportunities for deferring taxation in such cases. If the interest 
held is substantial, then it is perhaps less likely that it would be held for investment purposes. But we consider 
that the reason for the investment cannot be automatically deduced from the presence or absence of a 
decisive influence. It seems to us that the question that needs to be asked in future would need to concern the 
purpose of the investor. What purpose does the shareholding interest serve? The investor’s intention may 
subsequently be objectified, perhaps, through a functional and factual analysis of the position that the 
shareholding interest fulfills in the taxpayer’s property.48 
 
5 Final remarks 
 
The FII 2 case has made clear that general tax measures, such as a general direct tax system for income and 
gains from shareholdings, fall under the free movement of capital in third country situations and can be 
substantively assessed on their compatibility or incompatibility with this freedom, irrespective of the size of the 
shareholding. The CJEU has formulated a limitation, though. Abuse of the free movement of capital must be 
avoided. However, the judgment does not make it clear where and when the CJEU exactly suspects such abuse. 
Nevertheless, the abuse is not present in the FII 2 case and it seems that, in general, there is limited room in 
the area of direct taxation to identify such abuse of the freedom of capital. The FII 2 case has also shown (with 
hindsight) that the approach adopted by the Dutch Supreme Court in the recent past, was wrong. This has led 
to a discussion in the Dutch tax law practice on the legal consequences of this in the Netherlands.49 As regards 
how the free movement of capital will be interpreted in EU law in future, the FII 2 case has shown us that cases 
involving majority interests in third country situations must be assessed on their merits under EU law. It seems 
that the broader justification grounds in third country situations and, of course, the standstill provision will be 
given more prominence. As regards the standstill provision, we believe that the shareholder’s reason for 
investing in a shareholding will prove to be relevant. Is the shareholding interest held as a portfolio investment 
(no standstill) or is it held for business purposes (possibly standstill)? Such a distinction could produce 
interesting case law. We will follow developments with interest. 
 
 
                                                 
48 Cf. Maarten F. de Wilde, ‘A Step towards a Fair Corporate Taxation of Groups in the Emerging Global Market’, 39 Intertax 62 (2011), at 
70-71. 
49 Cf. E. Nijkeuter and M.F. de Wilde, “Met de kennis van nu...” (With the knowledge we now have...) (Part II); On FII 2, case law and what 
may follow, WFR 2013/185. 
